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BOOK REVIEWS
DNA AND THE GENEALOGY OF
SCIENTIFIC TRUTH IN THE COURTROOM
DAVID S. CAUDILL*
JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY
IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING (Rutgers University Press 2007). 270
PP.
In [1910 in] London, Scotland Yard and the forensic scientists of the Home Office
continued to puzzle over what had killed the victim found in the cellar at No. 39
Hilldrop Crescent ....
At St. Mary's Hospital in London, William Henry Willcox, a famed forensic
chemist and senior scientific analyst for the Home Office, took delivery of the five
jars of remains held in the Islington Mortuary .... He was an expert on poisons and
testified so often that reporters gave him a nickname, "The King's Poisoner."
1
The history of forensic science is intertwined with public relations, not
only in the sense that all of the sciences earn trust in the "court of public
opinion," but because juries must be convinced that a forensic expert's
techniques are worthy of confidence. Getting forensic science off the
ground was apparently not easy, as the "legal and medical journals of the
first half of the [twentieth] century are filled with lamentations of juries'
refusal to acknowledge scientific circumstantial evidence. Murder juries
often refused to convict in the absence of eyewitness testimony .... , A
* Professor and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School
of Law. The author is currently serving as the 2007-2008 Soci~t6 de Chimie Industrielle
(American Section) Fellow at the Chemical Heritage Foundation in Philadelphia.
1 ERIC LARSON, THUNDERSTRUCK 342 (2006) (historical account of Hawley Crippen's
murder of his wife and the impact of Guglielmo Marconi's wireless on Crippen's capture).
2 Julie Johnson-McGrath, Witness for the Prosecution: Science Versus Crime in
Twentieth-Century America, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 183, 191-92 (1998). By contrast, juries
today do not seem to resist scientific evidence: "On the criminal justice side, prosecutors and
journalists have offered the view that exposure to television shows like CSI have led jurors
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public relations campaign, however, "carried out through magazine articles,
World's Fair exhibits, short stories, books, and Hollywood movies"
delivered the message that "disinterested, 'objective' science was the best
weapon against crime."3 The FBI's Scientific Crime Detection Lab was
opened in 1932 as a model for similar municipal laboratories; an exhibit at
Chicago's 1933 Century of Progress Fair explained that a medical examiner
is "a non-political official, [an] expert in medicolegal pathology, who
conducts a scientific investigation into the cause of death, whose work is
purely medical [and] whose impartial findings are accepted by court and
jury in criminal cases ....
Even as some of the old forensic techniques-for example,
phrenology, hypnosis, and truth serum-lost their luster, the field of
forensic science has increasingly shared in "science's cultural authority as
pure, unbiased, and objective," and the testimony of a forensic expert has
been generally viewed as "unaffected by his or her own background,
beliefs, and social and intellectual biases."5 Lurking in the background of
this effort to "transubstantiate opinion into fact," however, is our sense that
forensic experts "ignore or deny that [their] truth was inevitably filtered and
shaped by professional experience, interests, and personal biases."6
Nowadays, forensic science appears to be in crisis,7 and its foundation
is cracking, or, in the words of Professors Michael Risinger and Michael
Saks, virtually non-existent:
Many of the forensic techniques used in courtroom proceedings, such as hair
analysis, fingerprinting, the polygraph, and ballistics, rest on a foundation of very
weak science, and virtually no rigorous research to strengthen this foundation is being
done. Instead, we have a growing body of unreliable research funded by law
to become extraordinarily demanding in criminal cases, insisting on nearly infallible
scientific evidence linking a defendant to a crime before they will convict." Valerie P. Hans,
David H. Kaye, Judge B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Science in
the Jury Box: Jurors' Views and Understanding of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence 3-4
(Cornell Law Sch. Research Paper No. 07-021), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1025582 (citations omitted). Hans et al. note, however, that
"[e]mpirical study of the CSI effect is in its infancy and the results are mixed"; while one
study "found that undergraduate students who watched CSI were more critical of forensic
evidence than their nonviewer colleagues," another found no significant relationship
between viewing CSI and treatment of forensic evidence. Id. at 4.
3 See Johnson-McGrath, supra note 2, at 192.
4 Id. (quoting Century of Progress Archives, Univ. of I11. Chi.).
' Id. at 193.
6 id.
7 See generally KELLY M. PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHALLENGES OF
FORENSIC LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICO-LEGAL INVESTIGATION SYSTEM (2007)
(discussing two recent, problematic trends, namely the increasing criticism of forensic
laboratory techniques as flawed, and the decreasing reputational status of forensic experts).
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enforcement agencies with a strong interest in promoting the validity of these
techniques. This forensic science differs significantly from what most of us consider
science to be.
8
Notably absent from the list of flawed forensic techniques, however, is the
field of DNA profiling. DNA test results, "as the gold standard of forensic
evidence," have eclipsed
other forms of eyewitness testimony, confessions, or older forms of forensic evidence
[which are now commonly assumed to be] ... erroneous or misleading. All other
forms of criminal evidence are now invidiously compared to "DNA" with its strong
connections with laboratory science and the impressive probability figures that
accompany reports of matching DNA profiles.
9
Nevertheless, even as we now equate DNA with "science" and "truth," we
should not forget that "U]udicial and popular notions of science are flexible
and historically changeable," or that "until recently, latent print comparison
(fingerprinting) was deemed to be an absolutely certain, unassailable, and
error-free source of scientific evidence."' 10
Responding to such warnings, Jay D. Aronson's Genetic Witness:
Science, Law, and Controversy in the Making of DNA Profiling offers an
historical perspective on the recent search for a "forensic silver bullet-a
foolproof technique that can identify absolutely the perpetrator of violent
acts from the physical traces left at the crime scene and provide a tool for
tracking ... criminals."' 1 Aronson, an assistant professor of history at
Carnegie Mellon University, explores the twenty-year process by which
DNA profiling became known as "the best method of forensic identification
ever created"-a "truth machine."' 2 In addition to his analysis of judicial
opinions and reliance on the substantial literature available regarding DNA
profiling, Aronson conducted extensive interviews with lawyers,
geneticists, laboratory scientists, and forensic experts. Significantly,
Aronson's historiography is informed by his training in science and
technology studies, an interdisciplinary enterprise associated with the
history, philosophy, and sociology of science, and with efforts to identify
the determinative social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science.
While the available legal literature on DNA profiling is voluminous,
8 D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, A House with No Foundation, ISSUES IN SCI. &
TECH., Fall 2003, at 35, available at http://www.issues.org/issues/20.1/risinger.html.
9 Michael Lynch, Expertise, Skepticism and Cynicism: Lessons from Science &
Technology Studies, 1 SPONTANEOUS GENERATIONS 17, 18-19 (2007).
o Id. at 19.
11 JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE
MAriNG OF DNA PROFILING 1 (2007).
12 See id. (attributing the term "truth machine" to former Attorney General John
Ashcroft).
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Aronson offers a unique perspective that emphasizes the co-production of
DNA science, which itself was the result of scientific methodologies and
laboratory procedures that were communicated, sanctioned, and employed
in a context of business competition, public understanding of science,
political interests, and the criminal law system, which included the needs,
motivations, and knowledge of judges, lawyers, juries, experts, and
defendants.
I. [RE]CREATING THE CONTROVERSY OVER DNA PROFILING IN LAW
When Americans think about controversies over DNA evidence that have taken
place in this country, Castro, Yee, and the National Research Council probably do not
figure too heavily in our collective memory. Rather, visions of white Ford Broncos,
bloody gloves that don't fit, and footprints from... Bruno Maglia shoes dominate our
perceptions of the use of DNA in the criminal justice system.
13-
Contrary to the notion that the controversy over DNA in the courtroom
climaxed in the O.J. Simpson case, Aronson demonstrates that "the debates
over DNA profiling were essentially over when Simpson's criminal trial
began in January 1995. ' ' 14 While doubts may persist concerning the
criminal justice system, as evidenced by the Innocence Project's success in
freeing over 200 wrongfully convicted people, 15 "DNA technology is no
longer on trial; in fact, it has now been rather neatly integrated into the
courtroom."' 16 Indeed, the founders of the Innocence Project, Barry Scheck
and Peter Neufeld, both of whom had been active in challenging the validity
and reliability of DNA typing in Castro and Yee, are nowadays busy
"instilling a kind of mythic power to DNA evidence"17:
13 Id. at 173. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), in which defense
counsel successfully excluded DNA evidence on the basis that Lifecodes had "failed... to
use generally accepted scientific techniques," brought the attention of the media, the
scientific community, the public, and the judiciary to bear on the issue of DNA evidence.
ARONSON, supra note 11, at 75-76. United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991),
is also considered a landmark DNA decision; even though defense counsel were not
successful, the discovery process revealed numerous flaws in FBI lab practices, which set
the stage for later defense strategies and scientific debates over DNA profiling. ARONSON,
supra note 11, at 136-37.
14 See ARONSON, supra note 11, at 173 ("The validity of DNA profiling as a technology
was never actually questioned by Simpson's defense team .... Instead, the defense focused
on the potential for accidental contamination and police malfeasance during the collection,
processing, and storage of biological samples at the crime scene.").
15 See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Feb. 2,
2008).
16 ARONSON, supra note 11, at 200 (quoting David Lazar, Introduction to DNA AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (David Lazar ed., 2004)).
17 Id. at 195.
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Sometimes eyewitnesses make mistakes. Snitches tell lies. Confessions are
coerced or fabricated. Racism trumps the truth. Lab tests are rigged. Defense
lawyers sleep. Prosecutors lie. DNA testing is to justice what the telescope is for the
stars: not a lesson in biochemistry, not a display of wonders of magnifying optical
glass, but a way to see things as they really are. It is a revelation machine.
It is this "sanitized version of history with DNA as the triumphant hero"
that Aronson seeks to revisit in Genetic Witness.
19
Aronson's historical narrative shows that "DNA profiling was a deeply
problematic technology when it was unveiled"-vulnerable to error, lacking
quality controls, and, in its interpretation of test results, "based more on
assumptions than empirical evidence., 20  Dedicated defense lawyers
brought such deficiencies to light, leading to debates (soon to be known as
the "DNA wars") and a resolution that challenges the notion that the
adversarial process-with its strategic lawyering, paid experts, and
confused judges and juries-tends to hijack scientific truth.2 Instead,
it becomes clear that the adversarial process served as a means to correct the problems
that arose when DNA profiling technology was transferred from the laboratory to the
courtroom. Thus, one of the main lessons that can be learned from this history is that
efforts to curb adversarialism in the legal system might not be in the best interest of
legal decision making or scientific advancement.
2 2
The other lesson, Aronson explains, is that some of the problems that
emerged in this history of DNA profiling remain unresolved:
There is a general unwillingness to admit that for all of the improvements made to the
technique over the past two decades, the potential for serious error in DNA evidence
still exists. As a result, there is still no effective means for calculating error rates in
DNA testing, no explicit standards for interpreting the complex results that emerge
from biological stains in which there are multiple contributions, and, most important,
no agreed-upon method for conducting proficiency testing in the dozens of DNA labs
around the country.
23
Everyone, it seems, concedes "that laboratory and interpretative errors
occasionally occur," but Aronson attempts to show that "DNA profiling is
not the infallible, foolproof technology that many scientists and lawyers
claim it to be.",
24
18 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED, at xv (2000).
19 ARONSON, supra note 11, at 195.
20 See id. at 3.
21 See id. at 3-5.
22 Id. at 5.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 5-6.
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II. THE STORY OF DNA PROFILING
Alec Jeffreys, a geneticist at the University of Leicester in Britain, invented the
first usable version of DNA profiling in 1984.... In order to understand Jeffreys's
new identification tool, it is first necessary to review some aspects of genetics and
molecular biology.
25
Aronson begins, as all books on DNA profiling must, with DNA
science, interspersed with stories of the first (immigrant identity) test, the
criminal investigation explored in Joseph Wambaugh's The Blooding, and
the early competition for dominance in the legal marketplace for
identification technologies between Cellmark Diagnostics USA (a unit of
Imperial Chemical Industries UK) and Lifecodes Corporation.26 Having
read many such introductions, Aronson's is not as user-friendly as, say, the
introduction to DNA profiling techniques in Truth Machine: The
Contentions History of DNA Profiling.27 Some readers will likely find
Aronson's account sufficient, and despite my criticism, I am confident that
Aronson has expertise in the field, that he had to make difficult decisions
about how much scientific detail to offer, and that more accessible
introductions are available for those who need them. The more important
aspect of Aronson's introduction is his explanation of how scientific
developments were marketed to and structured around the requirements of
the legal system.28 Irrespective of the shortcomings of early DNA profiling,
a few commercial entities were advertising an error-free law enforcement
technology. This promise was neither (1) likely to be tempered by
interested, in-house scientists, nor (2) easily challenged due to limitations
on public access to information regarding laboratory protocols and
company databases.29
Aronson offers a lengthy account of the 1987 Florida prosecution for
rape in State v. Andrews, where forensic DNA evidence, for the first time,
served as the basis for the conviction. 30 By 1988, numerous prosecutions
were brought based on DNA evidence, and defense lawyers seemed both
25 Id. at 7-8.
26 See generally id. at 7-32.
27 See Ruth McNally, Interlude 1 to MICHAEL LYNCH, SIMON A. COLE, RUTH MCNALLY
& KATHLEEN JORDAN, TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA PROFILING
(forthcoming 2008) (copy of manuscript on file with author).
28 See generally ARONSON, supra note 11, at 17-21, 30-32. For example, in Lifecodes
Corporation's work on single-locus probe ("SLP") identification technology, the
"requirements of the legal system ... played a crucial role in the decision to do certain
experiments and not others." Id. at 30.
29 See id. at 20, 34 (Baird and Giusti, expert witnesses for prosecutors, were employed by
Lifecodes); id. at 44 (access to laboratories and equipment used by private forensic DNA
analysis companies was limited).
30 See id. at 33-41 (citing 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
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unprepared to challenge such evidence and unable to find experts to testify
against what was being promoted as flawless technology. 31  However, in
two New York cases, 32 "the defense actually called witnesses to challenge
prosecution claims about the validity and reliability of [a] DNA typing
technique.33  Although the challenge was unsuccessful, a template for
defense attorneys had been established. By 1989, in the Castro and
Schwartz cases, a sophisticated and successful defense strategy emerged.34
However, the defense teams
focused on the inadmissibility of specific test results rather than the shortcomings of
the technological system as a whole ....
The defense community did succeed, however, in convincing judges that it was
crucial to ask what could possibly go wrong with DNA profiling in the forensic
context, rather than simply looking for evidence that the technique was generally
accepted in the scientific community for research and diagnostic purposes.35
And in the popular press, the "technique went from being considered
foolproof to potentially fallible overnight.,
36
The defense community also succeeded in challenging the capacity of
private companies like Cellmark and Lifecodes, with their proprietary
interests, to provide "common technical, procedural, and interpretive
standards that could be used to evaluate specific DNA typing results in
court. 37  As such concerns were shared by the law enforcement and
forensic science communities, the FBI took the lead in establishing a
standardized regime and a nationwide DNA database. 38 Aronson details the
various criticisms of how the FBI proceeded to colonize the field, and then
31 See id. at 42-46. "As James Starrs, a professor of forensic science was quoted as
saying in U.S. News and World Report: 'It's like Chicken Little saying the sky is
falling .... Mention DNA, and defense attomeys run for cover."' Id. at 42 (quoting Ted
Gest, Convicted by Their Own Genes: DNA Fingerprinting Is Facing a Major Legal
Challenge from Defense Attorneys and Civil Libertarians, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Oct. 31, 1988, at 74).
32 See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1988) (consolidating two
cases).
33 See ARONSON, supra note 11, at 42.
34 See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d
985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
35 ARONSON, supra note 11, at 87.
36 Id. Significantly, a 1999 study on juror reactions to DNA evidence "found that their
participants were concerned about laboratory error and other problems with the forensic
DNA samples." Hans et al., supra note 2, at 6 (citing Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 159, 159 (1999)).
37 ARONSON, supra note 11, at 89.
38 See id. at 90.
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turns to the defense challenge to the Bureau's methodology in United States
v. Yee.39 When the FBI "emerged from Yee victorious, 4 ° the controversy
shifted to the scientific community and its journals. Aronson writes that
"when Lewontin and Hartl decided to publish their critique of the FBI's
population genetics assumptions in Science ... [it] led to one of the fiercest
controversies in the recent history of science, with numerous accusations of
impropriety and unethical behavior being slung by both defense and
prosecution advocates. 41  In Washington, the effort of the National
Research Council to resolve the DNA Wars resulted in a report that caused
even more controversy (the details of which are extensively described in
Aronson's account); pressure from the FBI and others resulted in a second
report that "did little more than affirm policies and practices already in
place ... .,,42 The war was over-the "FBI wanted a document that courts
could point to as evidence that no controversy existed over DNA profiling,
and this was largely what they got.
43
III. DNA: THE HARD[EST] CASE FOR SKEPTICISM
For ... critics of DNA evidence, three crucial issues remained to be resolved [after
the O.J. Simpson trial highlighted the issue of how samples are handled before
testing]. The first was the need for an agency other than the FBI to regulate and set
standards for DNA profiling laboratories. The second.., was the persistent problem
of laboratory, human, and interpretation error compromising the reliability of test
results. And third,... the rate of error could not be estimated unless a meaningful
blind proficiency testing science was developed for DNA laboratories and
technicians.
4 4
Aronson reminds readers about the various fiascoes that occurred in
Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Nevada, California, and
39 See generally id. at 89-139.
40 Id. at 137.
41 Id. at 139.
42 Id. at 172.
41 Id. at 174.
44 Id. at 201-02. Aronson earlier highlights the debate concerning the possibility of
external blind proficiency testing:
For example, with limited time and budget, forensic technicians often ask crime scene
investigators which pieces of evidence are most likely to contain the genetic materials of the
perpetrator of the crime rather than testing every single crime scene sample. They also seek
information on whose profiles are likely to turn up, as well as information on... prime
suspects.... In other words, they do not approach the analysis of the crime blindly. To create a
realistic external blind proficiency test, the organization conducting the test would not only have
to fabricate an accurate and complete set of crime scene samples, but would also have to concoct
a story and find a law enforcement agency willing to submit the case to a lab and answer any
questions that the laboratory might have about the evidence.
Id. at 190.
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Illinois crime labs.45 Most notably, he recounts the Houston Crime
Laboratory debacle; the lab has remained closed as of March 2007 pending
ongoing investigations.46  The FBI's own scathing report of the
vulnerabilities of its protocols and laboratory practices followed the
discovery of falsified data not caught through official mechanisms.
47
Aronson suspects that the recent reduction of disputes concerning DNA
profiling, together with the FBI's ability to control expert commissions, the
voluntary nature of forensic science guidelines, and the inability of defense
attorneys to do their jobs--due to judicial reluctance to issue discovery
orders, the difficulty in finding experts, or chronic lack of funding-all
combine to eclipse concerns we should have about DNA profiling.4 8
DNA profiling presents itself as a very hard case for the scholar in
science studies (or science-and-technology studies, or the sociology of
science, as the discipline is often named), who rejects "the idealized picture
of scientific autonomy and disinterested knowledge that was stressed by
earlier generations. '49 For the academic skeptic, it is clear that "scientific
theories are underdetermined by evidence, that evidence is always theory-
laden, and that laboratory practices do not follow the idealized strictures of
scientific method." 50  This is not merely "vulgar" skepticism-which
targets corrupt political or economic interests, or fraud-but rather general
skepticism that "targets the adequacy of the very ideals that vulgar
skepticism uses as a normative basis for its particularistic judgments.",51 By
showing how science does not operate in a vacuum, science studies
highlight the inevitable social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of
science itself. This process has been called "opening the black box" in
order to show how scientific knowledge is constructed or co-produced.52
41 See id. at 203-05.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 206.
48 See id. at 207-08.
49 See Lynch, supra note 9, at 21.
50 Id.
"' Id. at 20-21.
52 "The plea frequently voiced by social constructivists is that we open 'the black box' of
historical and contemporary technology to see what is there." Langdon Winner, Social
Constructivists: Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty, 16 ScI. AS CULTURE 427, 431
(1993).
The term "black box" in both technical and social science parlance is a device or system that, for
convenience, is described solely in terms of its inputs and outputs. One need not understand
anything about what goes on inside such black boxes. One simply brackets them as instruments
that perform variable functions.
Id. In science studies, for example, data and methodology (input) produce scientific
knowledge (output), while the arguably co-productive features of science-values, interests,
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But some have cautioned that "the reliability and validity of DNA evidence
have become widely accepted; under these circumstances, constructivism
runs the risk of fighting an old war-to open up cold cases, so to speak.
53
Aronson is alert to this risk; he recognizes that his "making the claim that
DNA profiling is imperfect is not the same as calling it unreliable, invalid,
or inadmissible. 54 But he does want to make clear
that the development of the [DNA profiling] technique was not guided by a scientific
method or by any sort of inherent logic-there was no linear, rational pathway from
the laboratory to the courtroom. Rather, the technique itself, standards of good
science, and the expertise needed to make DNA evidence credible in the legal system,
evolved together over the course of a decade .... DNA profiling .. was just as
much about social engineering as it was about getting the science right.
In this way, Aronson avoids vulgar skepticism even as he avoids
challenging the utility of scientific knowledge. To say that the development
of DNA typing involved "social engineering" is not to say that the science
is wrong, but rather to identify, as inherent to that development, "scientists
weaving together technical claims with legal, social, and political ones, as
well as lawyers, politicians, and judges making choices that would seem to
require a great deal of scientific knowledge and expertise.,
56
IV. CONCLUSION
Aronson is not alone in his circumspection regarding the idealization
of DNA profiling.5 7  Nevertheless, he highlights an unfortunate
interpretive frameworks, negotiation techniques, and theoretical paradigms-are "black-
boxed" but can be revealed. See, e.g.; Nancy J. Nercessian, Opening the Black Box:
Cognitive Science and History of Science, 10 OSIRIS 194, 202 (1995) ("Cognitive history is
attempting to open the [black] box and to show how the cognitive and the social are fused in
the scientist's construction of knowledge.").
53 Hans Harbors, How Much Time Can We Stand?: DNA Evidence and the Principle of
Finality in Criminal Law, 13 CONFIGURATIONS 357, 360 n.7 (2007).
54 ARONSON, supra note 11, at 211.
55 Id. For the sake of readers who are not familiar with the terminology used in science
studies, of which this quotation is exemplary, Aronson could have made his point more
clearly. Indeed, if there is any weakness in Aronson's book, which I otherwise clearly
admire, it is his occasional tendency to use "science studies" lingo without explaining it to
the uninitiated. For example, when Aronson says that "the FBI did not build a forensic DNA
typing network by bringing together preexisting actors and material objects, but rather by
constructing the network and the human, material, and social aspects of it at the same time,"
id. at 118, I cannot imagine that readers unfamiliar with Bruno Latour's actor-network
theory, see generally BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION (1987), would have a clue as to
what Aronson is talking about.
56 ARONSON, supra note 11, at 4.
57 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 1125, 1140 (2003) (even though DNA
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consequence of the use of DNA testing to prove innocence, namely the loss
of a community of defense lawyers dedicated to investigating and exposing
the deficiencies of DNA profiling. Instead of making DNA science an
object of critical scrutiny, as civil libertarians did in 1988,58 DNA is
nowadays credited with creating "a new kind of civil rights movement. 59
This phenomenon produces an atmosphere that is hardly conducive to
skepticism about DNA technologies.
The depth and complexity of Aronson's history is not reflected in this
brief review-his research methodology, which supplements documentary
review with journalistic interviews, reveals details on which few of us in the
legal academy have focused. Specifically, the early (and predominant)
involvement of private companies in the development of DNA
identification technologies, the shift to legislative and government agency
control of the field, the early conflicts within the scientific community, and
the ever-present interactions between each of the foregoing (business,
government, science) and the legal system, all receive extensive treatment
in Aronson's narrative. Judges, lawyers, and law students, I believe, will
benefit from Aronson's "outsider" (i.e., non-lawyer) perspective on DNA
profiling. While his analysis of judicial opinions is perfectly adequate, that
is not what makes the book valuable for legal professionals. Rather,
Aronson's disclosure of what was happening outside the courtroom before,
during, and after the relevant criminal trials involving DNA profiling
provides a new and critical vantage from which to evaluate our latest "truth
machine."
testing is "the gold standard for expert proof," it "may, under some circumstances, produce
results that are completely wrong").
58 See generally Gest, supra note 31.
59 See Lindsay Catlett, DNA Testing Marks Beginning of a New Civil Rights Movement,
UNIV. OF VA. LAW., Fall 2007, available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/alumni/
uvalawyer/f07/dnatesting.htm (quoting Professor Brandon Garrett, Address at the University
of Virginia Law School's Lecture Series: Human Rights at Home: Race, Rights and the U.N.
Race Convention); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55
(2008).
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PUTTING PANDORA ON TRIAL
KAREN E. WOODY*
MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Cambridge University Press 2007). 298 PP.
It is impossible for offenses against the most fundamental collective sentiments to be
tolerated without the disintegration of society, and it is necessary to combat them with
the aid of the particularly energetic reaction which attaches to moral rules.I
In the wake of increasing globalization over the past fifty years,
international criminal law has transformed from a toothless shadow into a
concrete reality; the International Criminal Court is the most recent and
impressive institutional accomplishment. Unfortunately, international
criminal law has enjoyed this progress on the heels of increasingly horrific
international crimes. International adjudicatory institutions have taken
many forms and the sentences they deliver have varied widely.2 In Atrocity,
Punishment, and International Law, Mark Drumbl reviews the strides made
in international criminal law from the Nuremberg trials through present-day
trials, particularly those related to the crimes committed in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia.3 In doing so, Drumbl offers one of the most comprehensive
assessments of the role of punishment in international criminal law. In this
Review, I detail Drumbl's primary themes and acknowledge the book's
numerous and notable contributions to the field of international criminal
law. I then argue that a natural extension of Drumbl's theory of
cosmopolitan pluralism is the use of religious institutions as vehicles of
rehabilitation and restoration for communities fractured by mass atrocity.
* Law clerk to the Honorable Phyllis D. Thompson, District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. Ms. Woody formerly was a litigation associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom LLP. The author spent the summer of 2003 working in Kigali, Rwanda, for the
Office of the Prosecutor General. The author wishes to thank Laura Feldman for the
opportunity to write this Review, and Amy Dillard for her assistance and encouragement.
1 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR 397 (George Simpson trans., The Free Press
1933).
2 See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
3 MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
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I. OVERVIEW
Drumbl begins his book by giving an overview of the atrocities that
occurred in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Nazi Germany, and then describes the
national and international legal institutions erected to adjudicate and punish
4the perpetrators of these atrocities and others. Drumbl draws from a
variety of sources and disciplines to examine the rationales behind the
tribunals and their punishment schemes.5 At the heart of his analysis,
however, lies a sense of skepticism towards the liberal,6 predominantly
Western notions of common crime and punishment that are imposed upon
international tribunals charged with adjudicating uncommon crimes.7
While not entirely eschewing the merits of international tribunals replete
with liberal legal theories of punishment, Drumbl begins to outline the
limits of the tribunals in achieving the goals of the judicial process.8
In his early chapters, Drumbl writes about the fundamental differences
between perpetrators of the aforementioned atrocities and "common"
criminals such as car thieves or armed robbers. 9 He notes that the essence
of criminal law serves to punish social deviants-individuals such as the car
thief or the armed robber who commit hazardous acts, likely to warrant
punishment, that depart from societal regulatory norms.1° Yet Drumbl
points out that those who engaged in the mass killings participated in
"deviant" acts that were not necessarily banned by their particular society at
the time.11 Instead, because social norms were upended in the midst of
4 Drumbl's first chapter serves as a summary of the book's contents and of his main
arguments. While helpful to orient the reader, this chapter goes into such detail that the text
in later chapters seems, at times, redundant.
5 Drumbl has seventy-two pages of footnotes accompanying the text, citing sources as
varied as legal theorists, sociologists, and criminologists, as well as victims and perpetrators
of atrocity.
6 For an expos6 on liberal ideals, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4-15 (1993).
7 See DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 8.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 6.
10 Id. at 33.
11 Id. at 27. Another difference between common criminal law and law related to
atrocity is that typically less "law" is applied when the victim and criminal are close in
society. See DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989). The author notes that
"intimacy... tends to immunize people against law" in the sense that fewer judicial or
police resources are utilized the closer the relation between victim and criminal. Id. at 102.
Black posits that police tend make fewer arrests if the crime is, for instance, domestic
violence than if the crime was one committed between strangers. Id. at 11-12. The
"stranger" crime would necessitate that greatest amount of "law." Id. at 11. In the case of
the genocide in Rwanda, neighbors killed neighbors, priests turned over Tutsi congregants,
and doctors betrayed Tutsi clients. See generally PHILLIP GOUREvITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM
You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998). Thus, in
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atrocity, the civilians who did not participate in the killings arguably were
more deviant than those who did. 12  This mass involvement in social
deviance results in a pyramid of culpability: at the top are the conflict
entrepreneurs, who devised and strategized the mass killing, followed by
the leaders who remained accountable to the entrepreneurs yet commanded
others to kill; the next tier of criminals was that of the actual killers.'
3
Below this level are the complicit masses.
14
With this background of mass culpability, Drumbl deftly describes
how a combination of national and international judicial systems have
handled and sorted the first three categories of criminals. Drumbl
highlights the merits and accomplishments, as well as the shortcomings, of
international tribunals and national judicial systems designed to adjudicate
genocidal killers and war criminals.' 5  Specifically, he analyzes the
punishments meted out at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"), and the East Timor Special Panels, noting their similarities and
differences to the sentences given decades ago in Nuremberg. 16 Drumbl
then describes the domestic judicial systems in the countries where the
atrocities took place and national efforts to restore the rule of law after
atrocity.' 7 He points out that despite a larger variety of sentencing options
present in the national courts,' 8 the trends in the international tribunals, such
as the lowering of maximum sentences, have put pressure on domestic
judicial systems to follow suit. 19  He buttresses his argument with
sentencing statistics from both the international tribunals and national
systems of justice. 20 Drumbl asserts that this indirect international pressure
considering Black's theory related to common crimes about relational distance determining
the amount of law applied, the case of Rwanda certainly turns the theory on its head.
12 Deviance is defined in criminological terms as a departure from social norms. The
theory behind criminal law is to punish social deviants in order to maintain social norms and
the efficacy of the rule of law. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (4th ed.
2003); see also DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 33.
13 DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 25.
14 Moreover, to increasingly complicate the culpability spectrum, Drumbl acknowledges
that victims often became victimizers who themselves need to account for their crimes. See
id. at 44.
'" Id. at 46-66.
16 Id.
'7 Id. at 68-121.
18 Id. at 70.
'9 Id. at 121.
20 For example, Drumbl details that the ICTR has imposed twenty-four sentences, 45.8%
of which are life imprisonment. The ICTR's mean sentence term is 23.5 years, and the
median term is 25 years. In contrast, the ICTY has issued fifty-four sentences, and not one
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is a further imposition of liberal Western notions into domestic courts, and
that this pressure affects even neo-traditional, and originally restorative,
models such as gacaca in Rwanda.21
After detailing the sentencing statistics for the tribunals and the
domestic court systems, Drumbl shifts from a penological analysis to a
criminological one,22 lucidly outlining the justifications for punishment in
the context of international and national law and pointing out the varying
theories of punishment at play in the sentencing schemes. In his thorough
analysis, he first examines the theories of retribution and deterrence.23 He
posits that the goals of retribution are not attained in the international
tribunals because the punishments often do not fit the gravity of the
crimes.24  Additionally, the retributive theory is handicapped in
international arenas by the vast discretion of sentencing judges, the
selectivity of defendants, and the option of plea-bargaining. 25 Drumbi also
notes that the deterrence theory goals are not met by international tribunals
because it does not take into account the highly charged and collective
nature of mass atrocity; 26 moreover, he argues the deterrence theory falls
flat when criminals remain passionate about their cause and do not
recognize their culpability.
27
of them has been a life sentence. The average sentence term issued by the ICTY is 14.75
years, and the median term is 13 years. Id. at 57.
21 Gacaca means "justice on the grass" in Rwanda's local tongue, Kinyarwanda. Id. at
85. Gacaca is a traditional means of justice in Rwanda, originally intended to describe the
lawn where community members would meet to discuss minor grievances or property issues.
Ariel Meyerstein, Between Law and Culture: Rwanda's Gacaca and Postcolonial Legality,
32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 467, 467 (2007). In the wake of Rwanda's genocide, the Rwandan
government retooled the gacaca system to include thousands of local judicial panels that
adjudicate genocide criminals. Id.; see also DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 85-86. The highest,
and most culpable, category of genocidaires are prosecuted more formally, leaving the
gacaca system to handle murderers, attempted murderers, and property violators. DRUMBL,
supra note 3, at 87. In gacaca tribunals, members of the community speak and can ask
questions of defendants. Defendants are also afforded an opportunity to confess and
apologize. See id. at 85; see generally Meyerstein, supra. In addition, this author witnessed
gacaca proceedings and bases her knowledge on her ethnographic studies. See David
Caudill, Ethnography and the Idealized Account of Science in Law, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
269, 281 (explaining that ethnography applies "loosely to any fieldwork-based method,
including short-term observational studies") (internal citations omitted).
22 Penological studies focus on sentencing and treatment of criminals whereas
criminological studies focus on social deviance and examine the rationales for breaking
social norms. See generally, DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 149.
23 Id. at 150-73.
24 Id. at 155.
25 Id. at 151-68.
26 Id. at 170-73.
27 Id. at 171.
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In addition to retribution and deterrence, Drumbl examines
expressivism as a principal purpose underlying both international and
national adjudications.28 Expressivists believe that public punishment,
handed down by a court, serves to strengthen the rule of law in a society. In
other words, expressivism champions punishment as a means of reinforcing
social norms and promoting adherence to the law.29 Not surprisingly, when
I worked at the Prosecutor General office in Rwanda, I was charged with
analyzing the various transitional justice models to assist Rwanda' s effort in
lobbying the United Nations to terminate the ICTR as quickly as possible.
30
This task was a reflection of the national sentiment of disappointment and
frustration with the ICTR, which I attributed to the lack of expressivism
present within Rwanda. 31  Because the ICTR was located in Tanzania,
Rwanda itself did not have the opportunity for the many genocide trials to
be on display and to serve expressivist purposes, leaving the country more
embittered with the international community.32
Unlike many academics, journalists, or social scientists who either
discover, report, or analyze mass international atrocities, 33 Drumbl has the
courage and intellectual muster to include suggestions and proposals for
reform in the final two chapters of his book.34 Drumbl proposes reforms
28 See id. at 173-80.
29 Id. at 174. Interestingly, Drumbl points out that the importance of expressivism is
elucidated in the example of the United States after September 11, 2001. He states that had a
foreign state caught Osama bin Laden, "erudite judges from outside the United States would
determine his culpability, and that prosecutors from outside the United States would conduct
the proceedings, would be simply unimaginable to most Americans." Id. at 132.
30 The author worked for the Office of the Prosecutor General in Kigali, Rwanda, in
2003.
31 See supra note 21 and accompanying text on this author's ethnographic studies; see
also DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 130.
32 Rwanda had a seat on the panel at the time the ICTR was put to a vote at the UN
Security Council. The vote at the Security Council was 14-1, with Rwanda, ironically, being
the only country opposed to the tribunal's genesis. Rwanda found the tribunal flawed by its
location, as noted, as well as the lack of a sense of justice or punishment within the country's
borders and the lack of the death penalty option. SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM
HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 484-85 (2002). Perhaps nodding to this
frustration and the international embarrassment that Rwanda voted against the genesis of its
own tribunal, the ICTR has dealt harsher sentences than the ICTY. See DRUMBL, supra note
3, at 57. Also, Rwanda expressed frustration that the international community that sat idly
by when the genocide was occurring later took the reins to control how justice and
punishment would be effectuated after the conflict ended. Laura Bingham, Strategy or
Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 687,694 (2006).
33 See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 11; POWER, supra note 32.
34 DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 181-209.
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that he describes as horizontal and vertical.35 Horizontal reforms include
reaching beyond criminal law to areas of tort, contract, and restitution, as
well as looking to extrajudicial institutions in acknowledging the culpability
of the complicit masses.36 In this vein, he underscores the importance of in
situ sociolegal institutions.37 Drumbl argues that horizontal reform would
result in a sense of collective responsibility within a society, with the hope
that collective responsibility would prevent any future atrocities.38 Vertical
reforms include greater deference to local judicial institutions rather than
complete servitude to international institutions of justice. 39 Drumbl terms
this "qualified deference," meaning that there exists a rebuttable
presumption in favor of local or national institutions but does not exclude
liberal criminal law or criminal procedure.40
Drumbl suggests that these reforms stem from a notion of
cosmopolitan pluralism. 41 He argues that cosmopolitanism, with its belief
in global citizens and a universal moral community, would not do away
with international criminal justice but would balance the international
norms with domestic and local values.42  He bases his argument on the
notion that mass atrocities such as these require more complicated legal
frameworks than those of ordinary criminal law; 43 moreover, a philosophy
of cosmopolitan pluralism would result in greater universal accountability
while remaining true to both Western and non-Western ideas of justice.44
II. ANALYSIS
Drumbl aptly explains both expressivism and cosmopolitan theory,
positing that adopting the nuances inherent in these concepts would
improve the efficacy of international adjudicatory institutions. I agree with
Drumbl's thesis that the prevailing legal thought in relation to mass atrocity
has slowly started to move away from strictly international tribunals and
has begun to incorporate the benefits of pluralistic opportunities such as
31 Id. at 181.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 197.
3 Id. at 181.
40 Id. at 187-88.
41 Id. at 185.
42 Id. at 185-87.
43 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the complexities of the legal
landscape in a post-conflict society).
44 DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 205.
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hybrid court models, civil courts, and even non-adversarial systems such as
gacaca.45
Drumbl is correct that the scope of judicial options should be wider
than Western conceptions of criminal law, for the many reasons he details
in his book.46 The unique international crisis of genocide, such as that in
Rwanda, as well as the war crimes that occurred in Yugoslavia, involve not
merely a few car thieves and armed robbers-they involve and affect entire
societies.47 Thus, in order for these societies to experience restoration,
reconciliation, or even further the punitive goals of retribution, deterrence,
and expressivism, they must utilize all of their societal institutions rather
than relying solely upon their judicial systems.48 It would seem that the
most capacious way for a country to heal entirely is to use the means and
resources it has within its borders to recreate itself. As such, transitional
justice must incorporate local traditions, religions, and values in its attempt
to reestablish societal norms.4 9
Although Drumbl argues for the use of extrajudicial institutions in
exacting cosmopolitan pluralism, he never explicitly refers to the potential
of religious institutions in this role.50  Notably, the rhetoric of
cosmopolitanism is couched in spiritualityi t Cosmopolitans, however,
likely would shy away from the promotion of religion as a means of societal
restoration because of its potentially divisive effects.52 In defense of such
cosmopolitans, I recognize that many of the most horrific international
atrocities have been executed in the name of religion. 3 Nonetheless, the
role of religion in post-conflict societies should not be overlooked, as it
could be a vitally important piece in national rehabilitation. For example,
during my time in Rwanda, the two predominant ethnic groups informally
remained fairly separated in daily life, yet the local churches made
45 Id. at 11-14. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv.
1155 (2007).
46 DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 10, 123.
47 See, e.g., POWER, supra note 32.
48 See DRUMBL, Supra note 3, at 10, 123, 205.
49 See, e.g., DURKHEIM, supra note 1, at 398 ("[T]he characteristic of moral rules is that
they enunciate the fundamental conditions of social solidarity. Law and morality are the
totality of ties which bind each of us to society, which make a unitary, coherent aggregate of
the mass of individuals.").
so See DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 148 (listing examples of restorative justice initiatives
while questioning their efficacy).
51 Drumbl acknowledges that the roots of cosmopolitanism are intertwined in Stoicism.
Id. at 185.
52 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (noting the tenets of cosmopolitanism).
53 Numerous international disputes, including that of Palestine and Israel, have been
rooted in differences of religion. See, e.g., R. SCOTT APPLEBY, THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE
SACRED: RELIGION, VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION (2000).
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extraordinary efforts to bring Hutu and Tutsi together for services.
Moreover, the church services I observed while in Rwanda emphasized
forgiveness, charity, truth-telling, and the concept of a shared humanity
among all attendees. Indeed, churches, synagogues, and mosques are able
to bring diverse factions of society together, focusing them on a higher
principle-one that would bind individuals together as congregants,
worshipers, and members of a common belief. More importantly, the
fundamentals of this common belief mirror the moral goals of
cosmopolitanism and underscore social stability.54
It is axiomatic that sociologists have long remarked on the function of
religion in society. Regardless of what the religious belief centers upon,
religion itself serves as social cohesion and establishes a moral code among
its members.55 Even a Marxist cynic disavowing religion as the "opiate of
the masses" should recognize that the opiate itself serves a function-in this
case, it provides positive reinforcement of social and moral norms.1
6
Obviously, a strengthened role of religion in a post-conflict society is not a
cure-all measure.57 Societal reconciliation, however, is imperative. In the
case of Rwanda, the Hutu and Tutsi must live together and coexist
peacefully-there is not another option for society. Therefore, all societal
institutions should be used in the arsenal aimed at achieving national
rehabilitation and reconciliation. Religion is a particularly useful tool
because it has the capacity to create bonds stronger than ethnic ties by
literally idolizing a greater good and a higher ideal than the trappings of
humanity. Consideration of these benefits and others that can be attained
from an increasingly religious community, and the utility of religion in
obtaining the goals set forth in cosmopolitan pluralism, should not be
neglected.
III. CONCLUSION
The overwhelming strength and uniqueness of Atrocity, Punishment,
and International Law lies in Drumbl's ability to analyze the meta-goals
54 See DRUMBL, supra note 3, at 185 (expounding upon the goals and ideals of
cosmopolitan theory).
55 See PETER HAMILTON, EMILE DURKHEIM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 137 (2d ed. 1995).
56 KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
(1844).
57 Interestingly, truth and reconciliation commissions, an increasingly popular
mechanism in post-conflict arenas, lean heavily on religious themes, such as forgiveness.
The commissions also often incorporate religious ceremonies. See Jane E. Stromseth,
Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule of
Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251 (2007); see also Michael Nesbitt, Lessons from the Sam Hinga
Norman Decision of the Special Court of Sierra Leone: How Trials and Truth Commissions
Can Co-Exist, 8 GERMAN L.J. 977 (2007).
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and lofty principles that justify international criminal law and its
punishments while also being extremely detailed in specific examples.
Drumbl is able to explain complex ideas and theories at both macro- and
micro-levels with extraordinary lucidity. His research and personal
experience affords the reader with a staggering amount of unique and
invaluable information. This book should be a mandatory read for any
student of international criminal law and theory, and deserves the praise and
respect it has already earned among academics and legal practitioners.
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